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S. F., 47 Cal.2d 729 l306 P.2d 432]; Leonard v. Watson-
ville Community Hospital, 47 Cal.2d 509 [305 P.2d 36]; 
Danner v. Atk1:ns, 47 Cal.2d 327 [303 P.2d 724]; Barrera 
v. De La Torre., ante, p. 166 [308 P.2d 724], filed March 
22, 1957.) ·whether this conservative trend is in accord with 
public interest may be open to serious question. In my opinion 
it is more in keeping with the public interest that these 
doctrines be liberally applied by our courts. 
I would therefore reverse the judgment. 
[Crim. No. 5981. In Bank. Apr. 9, 1957.] 
THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. JOHN E. CHEARY, 
Appellant. 
[1] Homicide-Murder in First Degree-Killing in Perpetration of 
Certain Felonies.-To prove defendant guilty of first degree 
murder on either the ground that the deceased's death resulted 
from injuries inflicted on her by defendant in an attempt to 
rape her or in the perpetration of a burglary by breaking and 
entering the home of deceased's daughter with intent to rape 
the daughter, it was incumbent on the prosecution to prove 
that defendant had the specific intent to rape when he entered 
the daughter's home or that he had the specific intent to rape 
when he assaulted the deceased. 
[2] Id.-Evidence.-Regardless of whether or not defendant in a 
first degree murder case had the intent to rape deceased's 
daughter when he went to the daughter's home, the jury could 
reasonably infer, from his forcing open the door and grabbing 
the daughter after being informed that he was not welcome, 
that defendant then had the specific intent to rape. 
[3] !d.-Defenses-Intoxication: Province of Court and Jury.-
If defendant in a murder case was so intoxicated that he did 
not, as charged, have the specific intent to rape either the de-
ceased or her daughter at the time he went to the daughter's 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Homicide, § 77; Am.Jur., Homicide, § 39. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 13] Homicide,§ 15(6); [2] Homicide, 
§145(3); [3] Homicide, §§28, 163; [4] Homicide, §159; [5, 6] 
Jury, § 103(7); [7, 9] Criminal Law, § 522; [8, 10] Criminal 
Law, § 524; [11] Homicide, §§ 185, 190; [12] Homicide, § 267; 
[14] Criminal Law,§ 331; [15] Criminal Law,§ 1404; [16] Crimi-
nal Law, § 1086; [17] Criminal Law, § 1402; [18, 19] Criminal 
Law, § 1404(13); [20, 21] Criminal Law, § 619; [22] Criminal Law, 
§ 617; [23, 25] Criminal Law,§ 1404(12); [24] Criminal Law,§ 624. 
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home immediately preceding the killing or at the time of his 
assault on the deceased, he was not guilty of first degree mur-
der, but whether he was so intoxicated was a question for the 
jury. 
[4] Id.-Evidence-Defenses-Intoxication.-In a prosecution for 
first degree murder on either the ground that the deceased's 
death resulted from injuries inflicted by defendant in an at-
tempt to rape her or in the perpetration of a burglary by 
breaking and entering the home· of deceased's daughter with 
intent to rape the daughter, evidence that immediately pre-
ceding the killing he decided to go to see the daughter, that 
he drove his car from a tavern to the residence of the daugh-
ter's friend, identified himself, and unsuccessfully asked for 
the daughter's address, that he walked to a neighbor's resi-
dence and asked where the daughter lived, that he recognized 
his brother when he saw him in the daughter's living room 
following the killing, and that he had the presence of mind 
to absolve his brother of blame for the killing, supported the 
jury's implied finding that he was not so intoxicated that he 
did not have specific intent to rape. 
[5a, 5b] Jury-Challenges-Questions as to Death Penalty.-It 
was not error to excuse four prospective jurors in a first de-
gree murder case on the ground that they entertained con-
scientious opinions that would preclude their voting for the 
death penalty where, though there was some discussion of the 
propriety of the court's ruling, the tenor of the discussion 
afforded no reason to believe that the death penalty was over-
emphasized or that the jurors thought the court was endorsing 
the death penalty, and where the discussion was precipitated 
and prolonged by defendant's counsel who did not suggest that 
it be conducted out of the jury's presence until it was nearly 
terminated. 
[6] !d.-Challenges-Questions as to Death Penalty.-The jury's 
choice between possible punishments for first degree murder 
is to be made during and not before its deliberations on that 
question, and a juror who entertains views formulated before 
trial that compel him to vote for one of the two possible 
punishments regardless of what the evidence at the trial may 
reveal should be excused. 
[7] Criminal Law- Evidence- Documentary Evidence- Photo-
gra.phs.-It was not error to admit in evidence in a first de-
gree murder case photographs of decedent's body taken after 
embalmment as against the objection that no proper foundation 
for their admission had been laid, where the photographs 
[5] See Cal.Jur.2d, Jury, ~ 115. 
[7] See Cal.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 226 et seq.; Am.Jur., Evidence, 
§ 727 et seq. 
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were properly authenticated by the pathologist who looked at 
them and testified that they accurately portrayed what he had 
seen, for it is not necessary to authc>nticate a photograph, that 
the person who took it testify or be identified. 
[8] !d.-Evidence-Documentary Evidence-Photographs.-It is 
error to receive in evidence gruesome photographs of a homi-
cide victim designed primarily to arouse the passions of the 
jury, but such photographs are admissible when they are rele-
vant to the issues before the court and their probative value 
is not outweighed by the danger of prejudice to defendant. 
[9] Id. -Evidence- Documentary Evidence- Photographs.-
Whether the probative value of a particular photograph out-
weighs its possible prejudicial effect is a question to be re-
solved by the trial court in the exercise of its judicial dis-
cretion. 
[10] !d.-Evidence- Documentary Evidence- Photographs.-It 
was not an abuse of discretion to admit photographs of de-
cedent's body in a homicide case where they were admitted in 
connection with a pathologist's testimony regarding the extent 
of decedent's injuries and the cause of death, the latter being 
a matter disputed by defendant, and where they were corrobo-
rative of the pathologist's testimony and helped to show the 
extent of decedent's injuries. 
[11] Homicide-Instructions-Grades and Degrees of Offense.-
It was not error in a homicide case to refuse to give defend-
ant's requested instructions on voluntary manslaughter and the 
difference between murder and manslaughter where these mat-
ters were adequately covered by the court in its instructions. 
[12] !d.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Instructions.-Any error in 
refusing to give defendant's requested instructions directed at 
the difference between murder and manslaughter was not 
prejudicial where the jury found defendant guilty of first 
degree murder, and where the only ground urged by the dis-
trict attorney for such conviction was that the deceased's 
death resulted from injuries inflicted on her in an attempt 
to rape her or in the perpetration of a burglary by breaking 
and entering the home of deceased's daughter with intent to 
rape the daughter. 
[13] !d.-Murder in First Degree-Killing in Perpetration of Cer-
tain Felonies.-If in the perpetration of a burglary or at-
tempted rape defendant inflicted injuries on the deceased that 
caused her death, he is guilty of first degree murder even if he 
unintentionally inflicted those injuries on her, and it is im-
material whether he used his hands or fists or something more 
inherently dangerous. 
[14] Criminal Law-Conduct of Judge-Toward CounseL-Where 
counsel for defendant in a first degree murder case asked a 
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pathologist on cross-examination whether it was not common 
for elderly people to be bedridden, apparently in an attempt 
to show that decedent might have been suffering from hypo-
static pneumonia before being injured by defendant, and the 
court overruled an objection to the question commenting, 
however, that the question was "pretty broad," whereupon 
defendant's counsel attempted several times to explain the 
reason for his question, but the court refused to permit the 
explanation and admonished counsel that "there's some limit 
we can't go beyond," to which defendant's counsel replied that 
he did not appreciate admonishment when he did not deserve 
it, and the court then stated, "I'm the one that's going to run 
this court," the court's remarks were not inappropriate and 
did not bring defense counsel into disfavor with the jury or 
work to defendant's prejudice, especially in view of the fact 
that before instructing the jury the court explained to the 
jurors that in such cases the attorneys are necessarily under 
great pressure and complimented them both on the manner in 
which they tried the case. 
[15] !d.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Misconduct of Prosecuting At-
torney.-In a prosecution for first degree murder, an insinua-
tion by the district attorney that defendant's military record 
was unsatisfactory was improper, but did not result in preju-
dice to defendant where the court correctly admonished the 
jury to disregard the district attorney's statement. 
[16] !d.-Appeal-Objections-Conduct of Court.-A claim of 
misconduct on the part of the trial court will ordinarily not 
be considered on appeal unless the party who complains has 
given the court an opportunity to correct the error or false 
impression. 
[17] !d.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Misconduct of Court.-In a 
prosecution for first degree murder, the court's inadvertent 
statement, made a short time after admonishing the jury to 
disregard the district attorney's insinuation that defendant's 
military record was unsatisfactory, "of course, the matter will 
be subject to cross-examination and can't help be brought out," 
was not prejudicial to defendant. 
[18] !d.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Argument of Prosecuting At-
torney.-Where the district attorney in a first degree murder 
case, while summarizing the testimony of a pathologist re-
garding evidence of rape, stated to the jury that the pathologist 
was unable to determine whether there had been any inter-
course with decedent, and defendant's counsel objected, term-
ing such statement a "deliberate misquotation," whereupon the 
court stated that any misquotation did not appear deliberate, 
and then, after the district attorney urged that his remarks 
be struck from the record, the court ordered the remarks 
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stricken and admonished the jury to pay no attention to them, 
whereupon the district attorney said that the jury's "recollec-
tions are sufficient to recall what the doctor testified to ... in 
that regard," but defense counsel did not object and did not 
request an admonition concerning this last remark, neither 
such remark nor the original statement was prejudicial, espe-
cially where defense counsel, during his own argument, later 
quoted the actual statement of the pathologist, "I found no 
injuries in the pelvic area.'' 
[19] !d.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Argument of Prosecuting At-
torney.-In a prosecution for first degree murder, the district 
attorney's misstatement of the evidence when he asserted that 
decedent's friend had testified that defendant was pulling up 
his trousers when she entered decedent's bedroom, whereas 
the friend had actually testified that "he was holding his 
pants," did not mislead the jury where the friend's testimony 
was fresh in the minds of the jurors, the trial having lasted 
only a few days. 
[20] !d.-Argument of Counsel-Inferences From Evidence.-In a 
prosecution for first degree murder, the district attorney in 
his argument to the jury could reasonably draw an inference 
from the evidence that defendant was pulling up his trousers 
when decedent's daughter, a friend and an arresting officer 
entered decedent's bedroom, where it was uncontroverted that 
defendant's trousers were unbuttoned, where decedent's friend 
testified that defendant was holding his pants, and where there 
were blood smears on the back and top of defendant's shorts 
and trousers which could have been caused by defendant's 
pulling up his pants with his hands, which were covered with 
blood. 
[21] !d.-Argument of Counsel-Inferences From Evidence.-In 
a prosecution for first degree murder, the district attorney 
in his argument to the jury could reasonably draw an infer-
ence from the evidence that defendant "reached over under-
neath the blankets and underneath [decedent's] nightgown and 
grabbed her by the leg and at the same time crawling on the 
bed," where there were marks on decedent's thigh that could 
have been made by defendant's fingernails, and her bed spring 
could have been knocked down by defendant in climbing onto 
the bed. 
[22] !d.-Argument of Counsel-Scope.-In a prosecution for first 
degree murder, the district attorney's reference during his 
argument to "the pure, killing horror of the situation" was 
not unreasonable where he was speaking of the situation when 
decedent's daughter found that a neighbor's telephone would 
not function and she could not summon the police to aid her 
mother because she had not replaced her own telephone re-
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her telephone being on the same party line, and the 
district attorney's statement that defendant "didn't care who 
lhis victim] was as long as he satisfied that monstrous lust 
of his" was not inflammatory in nature where such an infer-
ence could reasonably be drawn from the evidence. 
[23] Id.-Appeal-Ha.rmless Error-Misconduct of Prosecuting 
Attorney.-ln a prosecution for first degree murder alleged to 
have resulted from an attempt to rape the victim, the district 
attorney's statement during his argument to the jury that 
"the specific intent which is involved is the intent to have 
sexual intercourse" did not constitute prejudicial error where, 
after defense counsel pointed out that the district attorney 
implied that one cannot intend sexual intercourse without 
intending rape, the court ruled that such remark was improper 
and later gave correct instructions on the law of rape and 
charged the jury that counsel's statements as to the law were 
not to be relied on. 
[24] !d.-Argument of Counsel-Scope-Arguing Law.-In a pros-
ecution for first degree murder, the district attorney did not 
misstate the law of burglary and felony murder where he 
argued that if defendant broke in the door of the home of 
decedent's daughter with intent to rape the daughter he was 
guilty of first degree murder, and that he was also guilty of 
such offense if, at the time he smashed in the front door, 
he had committed a burglary and the killing was done in the 
perpetration of burglary. 
[25] !d.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Misconduct of Prosecuting 
Attorney.-In a prosecution for first degree murder, the dis-
trict attorney's statement during his argument to the jury 
that counsel for defendant had not requested an acquittal 
because he did not wish to insult the intelligence of the jury 
did not constitute reversible error where it was improbable 
that the jury was misled, in view of the fact that defendant's 
counsel entered vigorous objection and the court admonished 
the jury to disregard such statement. 
APPEAL (automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239, 
subd. (b)), from a judgment of the Superior Court of Stanis-
lam; County and from an order denying a new trial. David 
F. Bush, Judge. Affirmed. 
Prosecution for murder. Judgment of conviction imposing 
the death penalty, affirmed. 
Jack B. Lamb for Appellant. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Thomas W. Martin, 
Chief Assistant Attorney General, and Doris H. Maier, Deputy 
Attorney General, for Hespondent. 
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TRAYNOR, J.-A jury returned a verdict that defendant 
was guilty of murder in the first degree and fixed the 
punishment at death. The trial court denied a motion for 
new trial and sentenced defendant to death. The appeal is 
automatic. (Pen. Code, § 1239, subd. (b).) 
Defendant contends that the verdict is not supported by 
the evidence. He also assigns as prejudicial error the court's 
excusing four prospective jurors on the ground that they 
entertained conscientious opinions that -would preclude their 
voting for the death penalty, the admission into evidence of 
certain photographs, the refusal of the trial court to give 
requested instructions, and certain allegedly improper state-
ments of the court and the district attorney. 
Defendant is 23 years old and at the time of the crime 
was home on leave from service in the Army. The deceased, 
Mrs. Minnie McDonald, lived with her daughter, Mrs. Nora 
Inglet, in Modesto, California. Mrs. Inglet is 54 years old. 
Mrs. McDonald was 84 years old and was in good health 
for her age. Mrs. Inglet met defendant in a tavern in De-
cember, 1955 or January, 1956. The two were introduced by 
defendant's sister. Thereafter Mrs. Inglet saw defendant 
on various occasions, usually in the company of friends, but 
several times defendant and Mrs. Inglet were alone in de-
fendant's car. Defendant testified that he had been intimate 
with Mrs. Inglet, but she denied that and testified that the 
last time she was alone with him, defendant attempted to 
force her to commit an unnatural sex act and that she left 
him and took a taxi home. 
On the afternoon of March 19, ] 956, defendant and his 
brother, Lester Cheary, left their mother's home in Modesto 
and made a tour of several taverns. They traveled in de-
fendant's car, and defendant did the driving. They drank 
beer at each of the taverns they visited, and defendant 
testified that he also drank whiskey. They had nothing to 
eat. Sometime during the afternoon or evening defendant 
made a remark about going to see a girl. At about 1 a.m. 
on the morning of March 20, defendant and his brother 
left Jim's Place, a tavern on highway 99, and drove to the 
home of Mrs. Iris McCurdy. Mrs. McCurdy was acquainted 
with defendant and was a friend and neighbor of Mrs. Inglet. 
Defendant stopped his car at a point across the street from 
Mrs. McCurdy's residence. Lester Cheary remained in the 
car. Defendant got out of the car and went to Mrs. Mc-
Curdy's residence. He knocked on the door, and when Mrs. 
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McCurdy answered, he identified himself. He first asked 
for the address of J. Reynolds, a friend of Mrs. McCurdy. 
Mrs. McCurdy gave him Mr. Reynolds' address. Defendant 
then asked for Nora Inglet's address. Mrs. McCurdy re-
fused to give him Mrs. Inglet's address. Defendant then went 
next door to the residence of Horace Smith. Mr. Smith told 
him that Mrs. Inglet lived farther down the street. Mean-
while, Mrs. McCurdy telephoned Mrs. Inglet and told her 
that defendant was looking for her and that he acted as if 
he had been drinking. .After leaving the Smith residence, 
defendant proceeded to the next house on the block and 
started knocking on the door. This was the house in which 
Mrs. Inglet and Mrs. McDonald lived. Mrs. Inglet did not 
go to the door immediately, but when the knocking con-
tinued, she went to the door and asked defendant what he 
wanted. Defendant said that he wanted to talk to her and 
demanded entry. Mrs. Inglet refused to open the door and 
told defendant that if he did not go away she would call 
the police. Mrs. Inglet attempted to telephone the police, 
but before she could complete the call, defendant forced open 
the locked door and grabbed her by the arm. She dropped 
the telephone receiver, broke loose from defendant's grasp, 
and ran screaming out the rear door of her house to the 
home of Mrs. McCurdy. She could not telephone the police 
from there because the McCurdy phone was on her party 
line and she had not replaced her own telephone receiver. 
Mrs. McCurdy's son, Bob, ran to the Smith residence and 
telephoned the sheriff's office. Two officers in a patrol car 
arrived shortly thereafter, and one of the officers, Mrs. Inglet, 
and Mrs. McCurdy entered Mrs. Inglet 's home. 
They found Mrs. McDonald lying on her bed. Her face 
was bloody. Her bed covers were down to her waist, and 
her gown was open to below her breast. The spring of her 
bed had fallen to the floor. Defendant stood nearby. He 
was bent over toward Mrs. McDonald. His trousers were 
unbuttoned, and he held them with hands covered with blood. 
The front and upper back of his trousers and his shorts 
were stained with blood, which was later found to be of the 
same blood group as Mrs. McDonald's. Defendant's shoes 
were under one dresser, his jacket on another. 
Defendant was taken into the living room, handcuffed, 
and seated on a chair. Another officer entered with Lester 
Cheary whom he had found across the street from Mrs. 
Inglet 's home. ·when he saw his brother, defendant asked, 
Apr.1957] PEOPLE v. CHEARY 
[48 C.2d 301; 309 P.2d 4311 
309 
"\Vhat are you doing here?" Defendant then said to the 
officers, ''He didn't have anything to do with it, I did it.'' 
Bob McCurdy then entered the room. He said something 
to defendant, and defendant asked Bob who he was. De-
fendant had met Bob McCurdy on several occasions previously. 
Defendant and his brother were then taken by the officers 
to the sheriff's office. Eu route defendant remarked that 
''According to military law, as long as the girl was over 
16 years of age, there is nothing that could be done to him." 
Defendant testified that after he had been taken to the 
sheriff's office, he was told to wash his face with cold water 
and that one of the officers walked him up and down in front 
of the sheriff's office to keep him awake. 
Mrs. McDonald was taken to a hospital. An examination 
revealed that her face was badly bruised, her nose and cheek 
bone were broken, and that her tongue was nearly severed 
from her mouth. After emergency treatment, she was placed 
in an oxygen tent. 
At about 6 :15 p. m on March 21, Mrs. McDonald died. 
After embalmment her body was examined by a pathologist. 
He found many bruises about her face, head, and neck, a 
large bruise on her chest, three fractured ribs, a bruise on 
her groin, and three small semicircular depressions on her 
thigh. He found no evidence of rape. He concluded that 
her death was caused by hypostatic pneumonia resulting from 
her injuries. 
Defendant testified that he was intoxicated and that he 
did not remember anything that happened between the time 
he left the tavern and the time he was handcuffed in Mrs. 
Inglet's living room. He further testified that he did not 
remember anything about the drive from Mrs. Inglet's resi-
dence to the sheriff's office. Lester Cheary testified that he 
had paid for the drinks for defendant and himself; that 
he had spent about 30 dollars for drinks during the course 
of the evening; and that defendant had been drinking more 
heavily than he had. Bob McCurdy testified that defendant 
repeated himself and acted as if he were drunk or drugged. 
Mrs. McCurdy testified that defendant acted as if he had 
been drinking. The arresting officer testified that he thought 
defendant had been drinking but that defendant had no 
difficulty speaking and did not stagger or sway when he 
walked. Mr. Smith testified that defendant did not act 
drunk when he asked for Mrs. Inglet's address. 
In his argument to the jury the district attorney explained 
310 [48 C.2d 
that he did not eontend that Mrs. McDonald's death was a 
deliberate and premeditated homicide. He urged that de-
fendant was guilty of first degree murder on the grounds 
that 1\Irs. McDonald's death resulted from injuries inflicted 
npon her by defendant in an attempt to rape her or in the 
perpetration of a burglary, breaking awl entering Mrs. In-
glet's home with intent to rape Mrs. Inglet. 
[1] Defendant correctly points out that to prove him 
guilty of first degree murder on either of these grounds it 
vvas incumbent upon the prosecution to prove that he had 
the specific intent to rape when he entered Mrs. Inglet's 
home or that he had the specific intent to rape when he as-
saulted Mrs. McDonald. 
[2] Defendant contends that the evidence establishes that 
he did not have the intent to rape Mrs. Jnglet when he went 
to her home. He points to his testimony that he had been 
intimate with Mrs. Inglet and asserts that that testimony 
shows that he had reason to expect that Mrs. Inglet would 
admit him to her home and that he had no felonious intent 
when he knocked at her door. Mrs. Inglet, however, denied 
having had intimate relations with defendant. Moreover, 
whatever was defendant's original intent, the jury could rea-
sonably infer from his forcing open the door and grabbing 
Mrs. Inglet after having been informed by her that he was 
not welcome that defendant then had the specific intent to 
rape. 
Defendant contends that the evidence establishes that he 
was so intoxicated that he did not have the specific intent 
to rape either Mrs. Inglet. or Mrs. McDonald. [3] It is true 
that if defendant •vas so intoxicated that he did not have 
the specific intent to rape, he is not guilty of murder in the 
first degree. (People v. Burkhart, 211 Cal. 726, 731 [297 
P. 11]; see State v. Vanasse, 42 R.I. 278 [107 A. 85] .) 
~Whether rlefendant was so intoxicated, however, was a ques-
tion for the jury. (Pe,ople v. Burkhart, supra.) [4] The 
testimony regarding the extent of defendant's intoxication 
is conflicting. It appears, however, that he decided to go 
to see Mrs. Inglet; that he drove his car from the tavern 
to the residence of Mrs. McCurdy; that he identified himself 
to Mrs. McCurdy, asked for the address of J. Reynolds, 
whom he knew to be a friend of Mrs. McCurdy, and asked 
for Mrs. lnglet 's address; that he walked to Mr. Smith's 
rPsidence and asked where Mrs. Jnglet lived; that he recog-
nized his brother when he saw him in Mrs. Inglet's living 
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room; and that he had the presence of mincl to attempt to 
absolve his brother of blame. Counsel for both sides argued 
the matter of intoxication at length, and the jury was properly 
instructed on the effect of intoxication. The jury's verdict 
necessarily implies that they found that defendant was not 
so intoxicated that he did not have the spPcific intent to rape. 
'l'hat determination is amply supported by the evidence. 
[5a] Defendant contends that the trial court committed 
prejudic.ial error in asking the prospective jurors whether 
they entertained conscientious opinions that would predude 
their "voting for a verdict carrying the death penalty," in 
allowing extensive argument on this point in the presence 
of the jurors, and in excusing four jurors who answered 
that they did entertain such opinions. Defendant urges that 
the death penalty was thus overemphasized and that the 
trial court lent its authority to the propriety of the death 
penalty in this case. ['6] The choice by the jury between the 
possible punishments for first degree murder is to be made 
during and not before the jury's deliberation on that ques-
tion. We recently held, therefore, that a juror >vho enter-
tains views formulated before trial that compel him to vote 
for one of the two possible punishments regardless of what 
the evidence at the trial may reYral should be excused. 
(People v. Riser, 47 Cal.2d 566, 575-576 [305 P.2d 1].) 
[5b] There was no error, therefore, in the court's excusing 
the prospective jurors in this case. Although there was some 
discussion of the propriety of the court's ruling, the tenor 
of the discussion affords no reason to believe that the death 
penalty was overemphasized or that the jurors thought that 
the court was endorsing the death penalty in this ease. More-
over, the discussion was precipitated and prolonged by de-
fendant's counsel, and he did not suggest that the discussion 
be conducted out of the jury's presence until it was nearly 
terminated. 
[7] Defendant contends that the trial ronrt erred in ad-
mitting into evic1ence three photographs of the deeedent's 
body taken after embalmment, on the ground that they 
were designed to appeal to the emotions of the jury. The 
only objection made by defrndant to the admission of thesi' 
photographs at the trial was that no proper foundation for 
their admission had been lain on the ground that the per-
son who took the photographs had not been identified. That 
objection was properly overruled. The photographs were 
properly authenticated by the pathologist who looked at them 
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and testified that they accurately portrayed what he had 
seen. It is not necessary to authenticate a photograph that 
the person who took it testify or be identified. (Berko-
vitz v. American River Gr-avel Co., 191 Cal. 195, 201, 202 
[215 P. 675] ; cf. People v. Ah Lee, 164 Cal. 350, 352 [128 
P. 1035].) Even if defendant had properly raised his present 
objection, the pictures were admissible. [8] Although it is 
error to receive in evidence gruesome photographs of a homi-
cide victim designed primarily to arouse the passions of 
the jury (People v. Burns, 109 Cal.App.2d 524, 541-542 
[241 P.2d 308, 242 P.2d 9] ; People v. Reclston, 139 Cal. 
App.2d 485, 490-491 [293 P.2d 880]), such photographs 
are admissible when they are relevant to the issues before 
the court and their probative value is not outweighed by 
the danger of prejudice to the defendant. (People v. Reese, 
47 Cal.2d 112, 120-121 [301 P.2d 582].) [9] Whether the 
probative value of a particular photograph outweighs its 
possible prejudicial effect is a question to be resolved by the 
trial court in the exercise of its judicial discretion. (People 
v. Reese, sttpra, 47 Cal.2d at 120; People v. Bttrns, supra, 
109 Cal.App.2d at 542.) [10] 'l'he photographs in question 
were admitted in connection with the pathologist's testimony 
regarding the extent of the decedent's injuries and the cause 
of her death, the latter being a matter disputed by defend-
ant. The photographs are corroborative of the pathologist's 
testimony and help to show the extent of the decedent's 
injuries. Admittedly they constitute cumulative evidence, for 
they show the same injuries to which the pathologist testified. 
That fact, however, was only one among the several to be 
considered by the trial court. (See 4 Stan.L.Rev. 589, 590.) 
The photographs are not pleasant to look at, but they are 
not ghastly. They show the body of the decedent resting 
on a table in the mortuary where the pathologist made his 
examination. The body is covered by a sheet except for 
the head, neck, and center of the chest. No incisions or 
marks made by the pathologist in his examination are visible. 
We conclude that there was no abuse of discretion in the 
admission of these pictures. 
Defendant contends that the court erred in refusing to 
give the following instructions requested by him: 
"Normally, hitting a person with the hands or fist does 
not constitute murder in any degree. Therefore, in order 
to constitute murder, in any degree, there has to be either 
an intent to kill or such wanton and brutal use of the hands 
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without provocation as to indicate that they would cause 
death or serious bodily injury so as to indicate au abandoned 
and malignant heart.'' (Defendant's Instruction Number 31.) 
"Where death was caused by acts of violence the character 
of the weapon used is of particular significance in deter-
mining whether the crime was committed with malice afore-
thought. If the means employed are of such a nature that 
normally they would not be dangerous to life, as where death 
is caused by blows of the fist, and there are no aggravating 
circumstances, the law will not raise the implication of malice 
aforethought. 
"If the implement used is not likely to kill or maim, kill-
ing is manslaughter unless actual intent to kill is proved." 
(Defendant's Instruction Number 32.) 
"Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being 
without malice. One kind of manslaughter, the definition 
of which is pertinent to this case, is voluntary manslaughter, 
being that which is committed upon a sudden quarrel or 
heat of passion." (Defendant's Instruction Number 33.) 
The court did not err in refusing to give these instructions. 
[11] Voluntary manslaughter, the subject of defendant's 
instruction 33, was fully covered by the court in its instruc-
tions (CALJIC 305, 311, 311A.) Defendant's instructions 
31 and 32 are directed at the difference between murder 
and manslaughter, particularly the element of malice afore-
thought. Those matters were also adequately covered in the 
court's instructions to the jury ( CA!J.JI C 301, 305, 308). 
[12] Moreover, even if the court erred in refusing to give 
defendant's instructions 32 and 33, such error was not preju-
dicial. The jury found defendant guilty of first degree 
murder. As noted previously, the only ground urged by 
the district attorney for such a conviction was that Mrs. 
McDonald's death resulted from injuries inflicted upon her 
by defendant in an attempt to rape her or in the perpetra-
tion of a burglary, breaking and entering Mrs. Inglet's home 
with the intent to rape Mrs. Inglet. [13] If in the perpetra-
tion of a burglary or attempted rape defendant inflicted 
injuries upon Mrs. McDonald that caused her death, he is 
guilty of first degree murder even if he unintentionally in-
flicted those injuries upon her. (People v. Sutton, 17 Cal. 
App.2d 561, 567 [62 P.2d 397].) It is immaterial whether 
he used his hands or fists or something more inherently 
dangerous. 
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[14] Defendant contends that the trial court committed 
prejudicial error in admonishing defendant's counsel in the 
presence of the jury. Counsel was cross-examining the pa-
thologist. He asked whether it was not common for elderly 
people to be bedridden, apparently in an attempt to show 
that the decedent might have been suffering from hypostatic 
pneumonia before being injured by defendant. The district 
attorney objected to the question on the ground that it was 
irrelevant and immaterial. The court overruled the objec-
tion, commenting, however, that the question was ''pretty 
broad." Counsel for defendant attempted several times to 
explain the reason for his question, but the court refused 
to permit the explanation, stating, ''I've ruled in your favor, 
Mr. Hancock, but I will state that I think you are getting 
into a pretty broad field." Counsel said, "I don't think 
I am." The court then said, "Well, I'm giving you a little 
admonition here. I want to give you every chance to cross-
question this witness, but there's some limit we can't go 
beyond.'' Counsel for defendant immediately replied that 
he did not appreciate admonishment from the court when 
he did not deserve it. The court then stated, ''In the last 
analysis, I'm going-! 'm the one that's going to run this 
court.'' Defendant contends that since the court criticized 
defense counsel, the jury, which looks to the court for guid-
ance, must have looked with skepticism upon the further 
efforts of the defense counsel. The court's remarks, however, 
were not inappropriate (see People v. Knocke, 94 Cal.App. 
55, 60 [270 P. 468] ), and we do not believe that they brought 
defense counsel into disfavor with the jury or worked to 
the prejudice of defendant. Indeed, before instructing the 
jury, the trial court explained to the jurors that in a case 
like this the attorneys are necessarily under great pressure 
and complimented both attorneys on the manner in which 
they tried the case. 
[15] Defendant contends that both the trial court and the 
district attorney were guilty of prejudicial misconduct in 
implying that defendant had an unsatisfactory military 
record. Defendant's counsel asked defendant, "How long 
have you been in the Army?" The district attorney objected 
that it was immaterial. The court commented that "strictly 
speaking it probably is.'' The district attorney then added, 
''His military record has nothing to do unless he wants 
to give his entire military record.'' Defense counsel replied 
Apr.1957] PEOPLE v. CHEARY 
[48 C.2d 301; 309 P.2d 431) 
315 
that he thought "the jury might be interested in learning 
some of his background.'' 'l'he district attorney then made 
the following statement, which defendant cites as preju-
dicial misconduct, "Yes, if you bring out h·is entire rniltiary 
backgrmmd, yes." (Italics added.) Defendant's counsel im-
mediately pursued the subject by asking the district at-
torney, ''Do you know anything about his military back-
ground?" The court interrupted with the comment, "Just 
a moment.'' Defense counsel then stated, ''I'll assign his last 
statement, the district attorney's as prejudicial misconduct 
and instruct-and ask that the Court instruct the jury--" 
The court then instructed the jury to disregard the last 
statement by the district attorney, and added the comment 
to defendant's counsel that "I think it's true, that if this 
man's military record is going to be put before the record, 
the district attorney would have an opportunity to cross-
question him-to cross-examine him on it.'' Defense counsel 
did not claim that this was an incorrect statement of the 
law but stated that he would withdraw the question if the 
court wished. The court then made the following statement, 
which defendant now cites as prejudicial error, "Well, so 
there is no question about any of the rights of the defendant 
being infringed, I'll allow that question and the answer to 
that, but any further than that, why-as I say, of course, 
the matter will be subject to cross-examination and can't 
help be brought out." (Italics added.) Defendant's counsel 
did not object or take exception to this statement, and de-
fendant answered the question, saying, "Yes, I've been in 
the Army six years.'' There was no attempt to elicit any 
information concerning defendant's military record during 
cross-examination or to introduce such evidence at any other 
time. 
The district attorney's insinuation that defendant's mili-
tary record was unsatisfactory was improper (see People 
v. Anthony, 185 Cal. 152, 158 [196 P. 47] ), and the trial 
court correctly admonished the jury to disregard the district 
attorney's statement. In view of the court's admonition, 
we do not believe that defendant was prejudiced by the 
statement of the district attorney. Unfortunately, the later 
comment by the trial court contained an implication similar 
to that in the district attorney's statement and was therefore 
likewise improper. Coming such a short time after its ad-
monition to disregard the district attorney's statement, how-
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ever, the court's statement was almost certainly inadvertent, 
and as noted previously, the court's attention was not called 
to the implication in its statement. [16] .A claim of miscon-
duct on the part of the trial court will ordinarily not be 
considered on appeal unless the party who complains has 
given the trial court an opportunity to correct the error or 
false impression. (People v. Arnaya, 40 Cal.2d 70, 78 [251 
P.2d 324] and cases there cited.) [17] Nevertheless, in view 
of the serious nature of the offense of which defendant has 
been convicted we have considered the trial court's statement. 
Upon reviewing the whole record, however, we are convinced 
that the court's statement was not prejudicial to defendant. 
[18] Defendant contends that the district attorney com-
mitted several acts of prejudicial misconduct during his 
argument to the jury. When he was summarizing the testi-
mony of the pathologist regarding evidence of rape, the 
district attorney stated that the pathologist "was unable to 
determine whether there had been any intercourse with 
Minnie McDonald.'' Counsel for defendant objected and 
termed this statement a "deliberate misquotation." The 
court stated that any misquotation did not appear deliberate, 
although it was possible that the district attorney's summary 
of the testimony was not accurate. Then, after the district 
attorney urged that his remarks be struck from the record, 
the court ordered the remarks stricken and admonished the 
jury to pay no attention to them. The district attorney 
then said, "Well, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, your 
recollections are sufficient to recall what the doctor testified 
to, Dr. Purvis, in that regard.'' Defense counsel did not 
object and did not request an admonition concerning this 
last remark. .Although this last statement of the district 
attorney might be interpreted as an attempt to have the jury 
disregard the court's admonition and accept his own mis-
statement as true, it is doubtful that the jury so interpreted 
it in view of the district attorney's previous request that his 
remark be struck from the record. In any event, neither 
this remark nor the original statement of the district attor-
ney was prejudicial. The court informed the jury that the 
district attorney's summary of the pathologist's testimony 
might not be accurate, and later the defense counsel, during 
his own argument, quoted the actual statement of the patholo-
gist, ''I found no injuries about the pelvic area. The opening 
of the vagina was rather narrow and I saw no evidence of 
any marks.'' 
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[19] Defendant points out that the district attorney again 
misstated the evidence when he asserted that Mrs. McCurdy 
had testified that defendant was pulling up his trousers when 
she entered the bedroom. Mrs. McCurdy actually testified 
that "he was holding his pants." Mrs. McCurdy's testimony 
was fresh in the minds of the jurors, since the trial lasted 
only a few days. It is unlikely, therefore, that the district 
attorney's statement misled the jury. Moreover, defendant 
did not object to this statement at the trial. 
[20] Although he concedes that the district attorney could 
present to the jury his theory of the case based upon in-
ferences reasonably drawn from the evidence (People v. Bur-
well, 44 Cal.2d 16, 39-40 [279 P.2d 744] ), defendant con-
tends that, during his argument to the jury, the district 
attorney drew two inferences that find no support in the 
evidence. The first inference was that defendant was pull-
ing up his trousers when Mrs. Inglet, Mrs. McCurdy, and 
the arresting officer entered the bedroom. This inference 
was a reasonable one. It was uncontroverted that defendant's 
trousers were unbuttoned; Mrs. McCurdy testified that he was 
holding his pants; and there were blood smears on the back 
and top of defendant's shorts and trousers, which could 
have been caused by defendant's pulling up his pants with 
his hands, which were covered with blood. [21] The second 
inference was that defendant ''reached over underneath the 
blankets and underneath her [Mrs. McDonald's] nightgown 
and grabbed her by the leg and at the same time crawling 
on the bed. . . . '' This inference was also a reasonable one. 
There were marks on Mrs. McDonald's thigh that could have 
been made by defendant's fingernails, and her bed spring 
could have been knocked down by defendant in climbing onto 
the bed. 
[22] Two statements made by the district attorney during 
his argument to the jury are cited as gross misconduct on 
the ground that they were inflammatory in nature. Although 
defendant did not object to either statement at the trial, 
we have examined them and find no error. One was the 
district attorney's reference to ''the pure, killing horror of 
the situation." He waR speaking of the Ritnation when Mrs. 
Inglet found that tbe McCurdy telephone wonld not func-
tion and she could not summon the polier to aid her mother 
because she had not replaced her own telephone receiver. 
The district attorney's description of this situation was not 
318 PEOPLE v. CHEARY [48 C.2d 
unreasonable. The other allegedly inflammatory statement 
was that defendant "didn't care who [his victim] was as long 
as he satisfied that monstrous lust of his." Such an inference 
could reasonably be drawn from the evidence. 
[23] Defendant contends that the district attorney's sum-
mary of the requirements of rape was prejudicially erroneous. 
The district attorney stated that "the specific intent which 
is involved is the intent to have sexual intercourse.'' When 
defendant objected, the court stated that it would instruct 
the jury as to the elements of the offense at the proper time. 
The court added that the district attorney's statement was 
''not out of line,'' but when defense counsel pointed out 
that the district attorney implied that one cannot intend 
sexual intercourse without intending rape, the court ruled 
that the remark of the district attorney was improper. Later, 
the court charged the jury that counsels' statements as to 
the law were not to be relied upon by the jury, and the court 
gave correct instructions on the law of rape. In this light, 
the misstatement of the district attorney was not prejudicial 
misconduct. 
[24] Defendant also cites as prejudicial misconduct the 
district attorney's statement as to the law of burglary and 
felony murder. The district attorney argued: ''If the de-
fendant broke in that front door with the intent to rape 
Nora Inglet, he is guilty of Murder in the First Degree. If 
at the time he smashed in the front door, when he crossed 
that line, he had committed a burglary; and the killing was 
done in the perpetration of burglary, in carrying out the 
act, and he's guilty of Murder in the First Degree if you 
want to accept that.'' We find in this argument no mis-
statement of the law. Moreover, the court admonished the 
jury not to rely on the statements of counsel as to the law 
and gave appropriate instructions concerning burglary and 
murder. 
[25] The final citation of misconduct concerns a state-
ment of the district attorney during his argument to the 
jury that counsel for defendant had not requested an ac-
quittal because he did not wish to insult the intelligence 
of the jury. Counsel for defendant immediately entered a 
vigorous objection. After first noting that some remarks of 
defense counsel could be interpreted as the district attorney 
argued, the court admonished the jury to disregard the dis-
trict attorney's statement. In view of the vigorous objection 
by defense counsel and the admonition by the court, it is 
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improbable that the jury was misled by the district attorney's 
statement into believing that defendant himself lacked faith 
in his defense to the charge of :first degree murder. 
The judgment and order denying a new trial are affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., and 
McComb, J., concurred. 
C.ARTER, J.-I dissent. 
I cannot agree that the evidence is sufficient on which to 
predicate a verdict of murder of the :fil'st degree under the 
law of this state. We are not here interpreting or applying 
the law of Moses-"whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall 
his blood be shed." (Gen. IX.6.) ".And thine eye shall 
not pity; but life shall go for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, 
hand for hand, foot for foot.'' (Den. XIX.21.) 
We are interpreting and applying the law of California. 
Under our law every homicide is not murder and every 
murder is not of the :first degree. First degree murder is 
defined in section 189 of the Penal Code as follows : ".All 
murder which is perpetrated by means of poison, or lying 
in wait, torture, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate, 
and premeditated killing, or which is committed in the per-
petration or attempt to perpetrate arson, rape, robbery, 
burglary, or mayhem, is murder of the :first degree; and all 
other kinds of murders are of the second degree.'' 
.As correctly stated in the majority opinion the only theory 
upon which the homicide here could be held to be murder 
of the :first degree is, that it was committed in an attempt 
to perpetrate burglary or rape. From an examination of 
the record there appears to be little doubt but that defendant 
was intoxicated beyond a point where he did not know or 
appreciate what he was doing.· But conceding that the evi-
dence was sufficient to support the implied :finding of the 
jury that he was not intoxicated, I am convinced that the 
evidence was not sufficient to give rise to an inference that 
he intended to perpetrate rape on either Mrs. Inglet or Mrs. 
McDonald. In my opinion the only rational conclusion to 
be reached from the record in this case is that defendant 
while in a drunken stupor perpetrated the sordid acts which 
resulted in the death of Mrs. McDonald. It was a ghastly 
and terrible crime, unprovoked and unjustified from any 
point of view, but I am unable to reach the conclusion from 
the record before us that it falls within the definition of 
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murder of the first degree as defined in the above quoted 
section of the Penal Code. (People v. Kelley, 208 Cal. 387 
l281 P. G09]; People v. Tubby, 34 Cal.2d 72 [207 P.2d 51].) 
For the foregoing reasons I would reduce the degree of 
the crime to that of murder of the second degree. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied May 8, 
1957. Cart()r, ,J., was of the opinion that the petition shoul<l 
be granted. 
[L. A. No. 24129. In Bank. Apr. 12, 1957.] 
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·where a business license tax sought to be collected is a 
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[2] !d.-Power to License or Tax-Territorial Limitations.-To 
allow a city to levy a license tax based on gross receipts at-
tributable to selling activities outside the city would be an 
unreasonable discrimination and a denial of equal protection 
of the law. 
[3] Constitutional Law-Constitutionality of Statutes-Construc-
tion.-\Vhere a statute or ordinance is susceptible of two con-
structions, one of which will render it constitutional and the 
other unconstitutional in whole or in part, the court will adopt 
the construction which, without doing violence to the reason-
able meaning of the language used, will render it valid in its 
entirety or free from doubt as to its constitutionality, though 
the other construction is equally reasonable. 
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et seq. 
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